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Market and political power interactions in Greece: an empirical investigation
IZA Journal of Labor Policy Pub Date : 2018-01-23 , DOI: 10.1186/s40173-017-0093-1
Tryphon Kollintzas , Dimitris Papageorgiou , Efthymios Tsionas , Vanghelis Vassilatos

In this paper, using a dynamic panel of 21 OECD countries, we find that, unlike the other OECD countries in the sample, wage setting institutions, competition conditions, public finances, and external imbalances can account for the behavior of the public sector wage premium (WPR) and the self-employed taxation gap (TSL) in Greece and to a lesser extent in Spain and Portugal, in a manner that is consistent with an “insider–outsider society” (IOS). That is, a politicoeconomic system characterized by groups of selfish elites that enjoy market power but at the same time cooperate in influencing government in protecting and promoting their collective self-interests. Then, we find that for Greece as well as Spain and Portugal, WPR and TSL have an adverse effect on both TFP and output growth. Finally, the effect of WPR and TSL on the business cycle (shock propagation mechanism) is investigated via a panel VAR analysis. Again, impulse response function analysis suggests that the shock propagation mechanisms of WPR and TSL for Greece and to a lesser extent for Spain and Portugal are quite different from the rest of the OECD countries. For example, in Greece, unlike the other OECD countries in the sample, a positive temporary shock in WPR causes TFP and output to fall and the public and current account deficits to increase. We take the TFP/output growth and the shock propagation mechanism results to provide strong evidence that Greece and to a lesser extent Spain and Portugal behave like IOS. For that matter, these results are important in order to understand the Greek crisis.

中文翻译:

希腊的市场和政治力量互动:一项实证研究

在本文中,使用21个经合组织国家的动态面板,我们发现,与样本中的其他经合组织国家不同,工资设定机构,竞争条件,公共财政和外部失衡可以解释公共部门​​工资溢价的行为。 (WPR)和希腊的自雇税收缺口(TSL),以及西班牙和葡萄牙的自雇税收缺口(TSL),其方式与“内外社会”(IOS)一致。就是说,一种政治经济体制的特点是,一群自私的精英阶层享有市场支配力,但同时也合作影响政府保护和促进其集体自身利益。然后,我们发现对于希腊以及西班牙和葡萄牙,WPR和TSL对TFP和产量增长均产生不利影响。最后,通过面板VAR分析研究了WPR和TSL对业务周期(冲击传播机制)的影响。再次,脉冲响应函数分析表明,WPR和TSL在希腊以及在较小程度上对西班牙和葡萄牙的冲击传播机制与其他OECD国家完全不同。例如,在希腊,与样本中的其他OECD国家不同,WPR的积极暂时性冲击导致TFP和产出下降,公共和经常账户赤字增加。我们采用全要素生产率/产出增长和冲击传播机制的结果来提供有力的证据,证明希腊以及在较小程度上的西班牙和葡萄牙的行为类似于内部监督办公室。因此,这些结果对于理解希腊危机很重要。脉冲响应函数分析表明,WPR和TSL在希腊以及在较小程度上对西班牙和葡萄牙的冲击传播机制与其他OECD国家完全不同。例如,在希腊,与样本中的其他OECD国家不同,WPR的积极暂时性冲击导致TFP和产出下降,公共和经常账户赤字增加。我们采用全要素生产率/产出增长和冲击传播机制的结果来提供有力的证据,证明希腊以及在较小程度上的西班牙和葡萄牙的行为类似于内部监督办公室。因此,这些结果对于理解希腊危机很重要。脉冲响应函数分析表明,WPR和TSL对希腊以及在较小程度上对西班牙和葡萄牙的冲击传播机制与经合组织其他国家完全不同。例如,在希腊,与样本中的其他OECD国家不同,WPR的积极暂时性冲击导致TFP和产出下降,公共和经常账户赤字增加。我们采用全要素生产率/产出增长和冲击传播机制的结果来提供有力的证据,证明希腊以及在较小程度上的西班牙和葡萄牙的行为类似于内部监督办公室。因此,这些结果对于理解希腊危机很重要。
更新日期:2018-01-23
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