Do the legal rights of creditors influence whether the firms borrow from arm’s length or relationship lenders in a country? We examine this question by exploiting the staggered adoption of legal reforms that changed creditor rights. We find that as creditor rights strengthen, firms exhibit a greater propensity to switch to relationship lenders. Conversely, firms switch to arm’s length lenders as creditor rights weaken. These results are consistent with the view that arm’s length creditors have a bias toward excessive liquidation in environments with strong creditor rights. Hence as creditor rights strengthen, firms switch to relationship lenders as they are less likely to sub-optimally liquidate the firm when continuation is more efficient.

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银行关系和债权人权利

债权人的合法权利是否会影响公司是否从一个国家的独立或关系贷款人那里借款？我们通过利用改变债权人权利的法律改革的交错采用来研究这个问题。我们发现，随着债权人权利的加强，公司表现出更大的转向关系贷款人的倾向。相反，随着债权人权利的削弱，公司会转向公平贷款人。这些结果与公平债权人在债权人权利强的环境中倾向于过度清算的观点是一致的。因此，随着债权人权利的加强，公司转向关系贷方，因为当延续更有效率时，它们不太可能以次优方式清算公司。