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Understanding the Advice of Commissions-Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life Insurance Market
The Review of Economics and Statistics ( IF 6.481 ) Pub Date : 2017-03-01 , DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00625
Santosh Anagol , Shawn Cole , Shayak Sarkar

We conduct a series of field experiments to evaluate the quality of advice provided by life insurance agents in India. Agents overwhelmingly recommend unsuitable, strictly dominated products that provide high commissions to the agent. Agents cater to the beliefs of uninformed consumers, even when those beliefs are wrong. We also find that agents appear to focus on maximizing the amount of premiums (and therefore their commissions) that customers pay, as opposed to focusing on how much insurance coverage customers need. A natural experiment requiring disclosure of commissions for a specific product results in agents recommending alternative products with high commissions but no disclosure requirement. A follow-up agent survey sheds light on the extent to which poor advice reflects both the commission incentives and agents’ limited product knowledge.

中文翻译:

了解受佣金代理人的建议:来自印度人寿保险市场的证据

我们进行了一系列的现场实验,以评估印度人寿保险代理商提供的建议的质量。代理商强烈推荐不合适,严格控制的产品,这些产品会给代理商带来高额佣金。代理商会迎合不知情的消费者的信念,即使这些信念是错误的。我们还发现,代理商似乎专注于最大程度地提高客户支付的保费金额(及其佣金),而不是关注客户需要多少保险额。要求披露特定产品佣金的自然实验导致代理商推荐具有高佣金但没有披露要求的替代产品。后续代理商调查揭示了不良建议在多大程度上反映了佣金激励和代理商有限的产品知识。
更新日期:2017-03-01
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