The need to give incentives is usually absent in the literature on minimum wages. However, especially in the service sector it is important how well a job is done, and employees must be incentivized to perform accordingly. Furthermore, many aspects regarding service quality cannot be verified, which implies that relational contracts have to be used to provide incentives. The present article shows that in this case, a minimum wage increases implemented effort, i.e., realized service quality, as well as the efficiency of an employment relationship. Hence, it can be explained why productivity and service quality went up after the introduction of the British National Minimum Wage, and that this might actually have caused a more efficient labor market. Furthermore, if workers have low bargaining power, a higher minimum wage also increases firm profits and consequently employment. Therefore, the present article presents a new perspective on reasons for why minimum wages often have no or only negligible employment effects.

中文翻译：

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最低工资和关系合同

关于最低工资的文献中通常缺乏激励措施。但是，特别是在服务领域，完成工作的质量很重要，必须激励员工相应地执行。此外，关于服务质量的许多方面无法得到验证，这意味着必须使用关系合同来提供激励。本文表明，在这种情况下，最低工资会增加实施工作量，即实现的服务质量以及雇佣关系的效率。因此，可以解释为什么引入《英国国家最低工资》后生产率和服务质量会提高，这实际上可能导致了更有效的劳动力市场。此外，如果工人的议价能力低，更高的最低工资也可以增加公司的利润，从而增加就业。因此，本文提出了关于为什么最低工资通常没有或仅有微不足道的就业影响的新观点。