In this response to Allen and Pardo’s Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, I argue that while relative plausibility presents certain advantages over probabilism, it also fails to avoid several problems that the authors attribute to probabilism. I note that relative plausibility can be understood as probabilism under certain constraints that characterise a typical trial. I then argue that two of Allen and Pardo’s central problems with probabilism—the absence of an objective means for measuring the strength of evidence and the conjunction problem—apply to both probabilism and relative plausibility, although neither problem poses a serious threat to accuracy. I conclude that each theory, despite these problems, is useful for certain purposes—relative plausibility better models how advocates present cases and how jurors process information; probabilism serves as a valuable tool for modelling relevance and prejudice.

中文翻译：

---

似真性和概率性的常见问题

在对艾伦和帕尔多的相对合理性及其批评者的回应中，我认为虽然相对合理性比概率论具有某些优势，但它也未能避免作者归因于概率论的几个问题。我注意到，相对合理性可以被理解为在表征典型试验的某些限制条件下的概率。然后我认为，艾伦和帕尔多关于概率论的两个核心问题——缺乏衡量证据强度的客观手段和合取问题——适用于概率论和相对合理性，尽管这两个问题都不会对准确性构成严重威胁。我的结论是，尽管存在这些问题，但每种理论对于某些目的都是有用的——相对合理性更好地模拟了辩护人如何陈述案件以及陪审员如何处理信息；