Allen and Pardo’s explanation of Relative Plausibility as a theory of evidence and proof in litigation is ambiguous and underspecified. Their account suggests at least three different interpretations of what they mean. They might be advocating “anti-halfism,” which tracks the “conventional account” but merely rejects >0.5 as the proper standard of proof. Or they might be advocating “probabilistic holism,” in which trial decision-makers apply probability to whole claims but not elements – in which case it remains to be explained how such an approach is internally coherent. Or they might be endorsing “total anti-probabilism,” in which “plausibility” obeys rules and axioms different from those of probability – rules and axioms that Allen and Pardo have yet to identify. To date, Allen and Pardo have side-stepped criticisms by shifting from one interpretation to another, strategically. Aside from presenting a theory too formless to determine how well it fits actual jury behavior, Allen and Pardo have not presented any robust empirical observations about how juries actually decide cases (despite their claims to do so). Before we can really assess whether Relative Plausibility is a new paradigm for understanding the structure of evidence and proof in litigation, Allen and Pardo must tell us much more about what it actually is.

中文翻译：

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什么是相对合理性？

Allen 和 Pardo 将相对合理性作为诉讼中的证据和证明理论的解释是模棱两可的，而且没有具体说明。他们的描述至少对他们的意思提出了三种不同的解释。他们可能在鼓吹“反半边主义”，它追踪“常规账户”，但仅仅拒绝将 >0.5 作为适当的证明标准。或者他们可能提倡“概率整体论”，其中审判决策者将概率应用于整个主张而不是要素—​​—在这种情况下，仍有待解释这种方法如何内部连贯。或者他们可能赞同“完全反概率论”，其中“合理性”遵循与概率不同的规则和公理——艾伦和帕尔多尚未确定的规则和公理。迄今为止，艾伦和帕尔多通过从一种解释转变为另一种解释，战略性地回避了批评。除了提出一个过于空洞的理论，无法确定它有多适合实际陪审团行为之外，艾伦和帕尔多还没有就陪审团如何实际决定案件提出任何强有力的实证观察（尽管他们声称这样做）。在我们真正评估相对合理性是否是理解诉讼中证据和证明结构的新范式之前，艾伦和帕尔多必须告诉我们更多关于它究竟是什么的信息。