Abstract

Dependent on Libya for over 40 percent of its crude oil imports, West Germany was already vulnerable when Muammar Gaddafi inaugurated his resource sovereigntist campaign at the end of 1970. This reliance on Libyan crude, however, was more than a liability for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Instead, this article argues that, as a genuine interdependency between the West German downstream and the Libyan upstream, the asymmetrical German-Libyan trade relationship not only restricted the FRG’s maneuverability but also enabled it to navigate the changing Libyan petroleum landscape during the domestic inversion of company-government relations and Gaddafi's foreign-political radicalization of the early 1970s. Despite the purported illogic of Libyan political and economic policy, the FRG achieved critical goals –neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, energy security, and rebalanced German-Libyan trade relations – precisely because of the mutually binding economic rationality on which the interdependency was founded.

摘要

当穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲在 1970 年底开始他的资源主权主义运动时，西德 40% 以上的原油进口依赖于利比亚。然而，这种对利比亚原油的依赖对联邦共和国来说不仅仅是一种负担。德国（FRG）。相反，本文认为，作为西德下游和利比亚上游之间真正的相互依存关系，不对称的德国-利比亚贸易关系不仅限制了 FRG 的机动性，而且使其能够在国内反转期间驾驭不断变化的利比亚石油格局。公司与政府的关系和卡扎菲在 1970 年代初期的外交政治激进化。尽管据称利比亚的政治和经济政策不合逻辑，