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Dynamic decision making under ambiguity: An experimental investigation
Games and Economic Behavior ( IF 1.265 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-17 , DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.002
Konstantinos Georgalos

Neoclassical economic theory assumes that whenever agents tackle dynamic decisions under ambiguity, preferences are represented by the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model and prior beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule, upon the arrival of partial information. Nevertheless, when one considers non-neutral ambiguity attitudes, either the axiom of dynamic consistency or of consequentialism should be relaxed. Using data from an economic experiment on dynamic choice under ambiguity, we study which of the two rationality axioms people violate, along with the question of whether this violation is part of a conscious planning strategy or not. The combination of the two, allows us to classify non-SEU subjects to three behavioural types: resolute, naïve and sophisticated. The hypothesis of Bayesian updating is rejected for more than half of the experimental population. For ambiguity non-neutral subjects, we find that the majority are sophisticated, a few are naïve and very few are resolute.



中文翻译:

模糊性下的动态决策:一项实验研究

新古典经济学理论假设,只要代理人在歧义下解决动态决策,偏好就会由主观预期效用(SEU)模型来表示,并且根据部分信息的到达会根据贝叶斯规则更新先验信念。然而,当考虑非中立的歧义态度时,动态一致性公理或结果论公理应该放松。使用关于歧义下动态选择的经济实验数据,我们研究了人们违反的两个理性公理中的哪一个,以及这种违反是否属于有意识的计划策略的问题。两者的结合使我们可以将非SEU主体分为三种行为类型:坚决,天真和复杂。贝叶斯更新的假设被超过一半的实验人群所拒绝。对于模棱两可的非中立主题,我们发现大多数是老练的,一些是幼稚的,很少是坚决的。

更新日期:2021-02-23
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