Many of Dworkin’s interlocutors saw his ‘one-system view’, according to which law is a branch of morality, as a radical shift. I argue that it is better seen as a different way of expressing his longstanding view that legal theory is an inherently normative endeavor. Dworkin emphasizes that fact and value are separate domains, and one cannot ground claims of one sort in the other domain. On this view, legal philosophy can only answer questions from within either domain. We cannot ask metaphysical questions about which domain law ‘properly’ belongs in; these would be archimedean, and Dworkin has long argued against archimedeanism. The one-system view, then, is best understood as an invitation to join Dworkin in asking moral questions from within the domain of value. Finally, I argue that Dworkin’s view can be understood as a version of ‘eliminativism’, a growing trend in legal philosophy.

德沃金的许多对话者将他的“一个系统的观点”视为根本性的转变，据此，法律是道德的一个分支。我认为，最好将其视为表达他的长期观点的另一种方式，即法律理论是一种固有的规范性努力。德沃金强调事实和价值是独立的领域，一个不能在另一领域中主张一种主张。根据这种观点，法律哲学只能回答任何一个领域的问题。我们不能问关于“适当”属于哪个领域法的形而上学的问题。这些都是阿基米德主义，德沃金很久以来一直反对阿基米德主义。因此，最好将单系统观点理解为邀请德沃金加入价值领域内的道德问题的邀请。最后，