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Goldilocks Deference?
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies ( IF 1.268 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-17 , DOI: 10.1111/jels.12278
Daniel H. Cole, Elizabeth Baldwin, Katie Meehan

Over the years, courts reviewing rules and decisions of federal administrative agencies have given those agencies greater or narrower latitude in interpreting enabling legislation, ranging from the “hard look” doctrine to various levels of deference under case names such as Chevron, Auer, and Skidmore. This article examines a distinct type of judicial deference that might arise only in a special subset of cases where an agency is sued by two different interested parties arguing diametrically opposed positions. For example, the EPA may be sued on a major, substantive rule by the regulated industry arguing that the rule is too restrictive and by environmental groups arguing that it is too lax. In such cases, we hypothesize that reviewing courts might exercise “Goldilocks deference,” based on the assumption that if environmental groups and regulated industries are dissatisfied, then the agency's rule must be just about right. Using an empirical dataset of 160 cases, we show that the EPA is more likely to prevail when it is sued by both sides, suggesting that the hypothesis of Goldilocks deference is at least plausible.

中文翻译:

金发姑娘顺从吗?

多年来,法院在审查联邦行政机构的规则和决定时赋予了这些机构更大或更窄的解释授权立法的自由度,从“硬汉”学说到在诸如雪佛龙AuerSkidmore等案件名称下的各种不同程度的尊重。本文研究了仅在特殊情况下才会发生的司法上的区别对待,这种情况仅在两个不同的利害关系方针对完全相反的立场提起诉讼的情况下才会出现。例如,受监管的行业可能会以一项主要的,实质性的规则为由起诉该EPA,因为该行业认为该规则过于严格,而环保团体则认为它过于宽松。在这种情况下,我们假设,如果环境团体和受管制的行业不满意,那么该机构的规则就必须是正确的。使用160个案例的经验数据集,我们表明,当EPA被双方起诉时,EPA更有可能占上风,这表明对Goldilocks尊重的假设至少是合理的。
更新日期:2021-04-05
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