We examine public policy toward the use of genetic tests by insurers when a positive test makes actuarially fair insurance too expensive for some consumers. With state-dependent utility, consumers may decline actuarially fair insurance if the probability of becoming ill exceeds a threshold. In markets with adverse selection, a positive genetic test may cause all or some high risks to drop out of the market (complete and partial genetic discrimination, respectively). Full participation in the market by all consumers requires cross-subsidization. We show that the consent law and mandatory testing are equivalent. Under complete genetic discrimination, the duty to disclose is never Pareto dominated, but either the code of conduct or consent law can yield the same outcome. Under partial genetic discrimination, the duty to disclose is never Pareto dominated. However, partial genetic discrimination and cross-subsidization imply the information ban is noncomparable to the other policy alternatives.

当阳性测试使精算公平保险对某些消费者而言过于昂贵时，我们研究了保险公司使用基因测试的公共政策。对于依赖于状态的效用，如果生病的可能性超过阈值，消费者可能会拒绝精算公平保险。在逆向选择市场中，阳性基因检测可能会导致全部或部分高风险退出市场（分别是完全和部分基因歧视）。所有消费者全面参与市场需要交叉补贴。我们表明同意法和强制性测试是等效的。在完全的基因歧视下，披露的义务从来不是帕累托主导的，但行为准则或同意法都可以产生相同的结果。在部分基因歧视下，披露的义务从来不是帕累托主导的。然而，部分基因歧视和交叉补贴意味着信息禁令与其他政策选择是不可比的。