Consider a firm owned by shareholders with heterogeneous beliefs and discount rates who delegate to a manager the choice of a production plan. The shareholders and the manager can trade contingent claims in a complete asset market. Shareholders cannot observe the chosen production plan and design a compensation scheme so that at equilibrium the manager chooses the plan they prefer and reveals it truthfully. We show that at equilibrium (i) profit is maximized, (ii) the manager gets a constant share of production, (iii) she has no incentive to trade. We then show that such equilibrium exists if and only if the manager has the same belief and discount rate as the representative shareholder. This allows us to characterize the required characteristics of the manager as a function of shareholders’ characteristics.

考虑一个由具有不同信念和折扣率的股东所拥有的公司，他们将管理计划的选择委托给经理。股东和经理可以在完整的资产市场中交易或有债权。股东无法遵守所选的生产计划并设计薪酬计划，因此经理在平衡时选择自己喜欢的计划并如实披露。我们表明，在均衡状态下（i）利润最大化，（ii）经理获得了恒定的生产份额，（iii）她没有交易动机。然后我们证明，当且仅当经理具有与代表股东相同的信念和折现率时，这种均衡才存在。这使我们能够根据股东特征来描述经理的必要特征。