This study examined the effects of financial incentives on security policy compliance. Participants were recruited for a computerized in-basket job simulation and randomly assigned to one of three groups: (1) control group with no financial incentives for compliance; (2) positive frame (gain) group where participants could gain up to $5 for compliance; (3) negative frame (loss) group where participants were awarded $5, but would lose a portion with each compliance failure. Incentives increased individuals’ vigilance toward phishing emails and decreased likelihood of clicking on links, with the negative frame incentive having the strongest effects. Incentives worked better for non-contextualized emails.

这项研究检查了财务激励措施对安全策略合规性的影响。招募参加者进行计算机化的篮内工作模拟，并随机分配到以下三个组之一：（1）对照组，没有遵从财务激励措施；（2）正面框架（增益）组，参与者可以从中获得最高$ 5的遵守费用；（3）否定框架（损失）组，参与者获得5美元的奖励，但每次合规失败都会损失一部分。激励措施提高了个人对网络钓鱼电子邮件的警惕性，并降低了单击链接的可能性，其中负面框架激励作用最强。对于非上下文电子邮件，激励措施效果更好。