Standard approaches to environmental and natural resource use externalities generally focus on single-sector resources and user groups. Remedies include Pigouvian-style government constraints, small group controls following Elinor Ostrom, or less frequently, bargaining across users as outlined by Ronald Coase. However, many difficult natural resource management problems involve competing uses of the same resource or multiple interdependent resources, across multiple, heterogeneous sectors. Cross-sectoral externalities are generated and impede attainment of conservation objectives. The multiplicity of resources and stakeholders, who may have different property rights, hold different use or non-use values, have different traditions, or fall under different regulatory regimes, increases the likelihood of multi-jurisdictional conflicts. We provide an institutional analysis following Oliver Williamson's four-levels of institutions (social embeddedness, institutional environment, governance, resource allocation) to illustrate the sources of potential conflict, the costs of addressing them, and the potentials for exchange. In comparing the costs of alternative approaches, we include transaction costs associated property rights; the costs of lobbying, implementing, and enforcing government regulation; and the costs of scaling up from small-group controls when resource problems involve multiple sectors and heterogeneous populations. In our illustrative case examples, instruments that are not formal property rights are exchanged at lower transaction costs. We close by discussing how Coasean, Pareto-improving voluntary exchange agreements may be lower cost, more effective, and more durable solutions than alternative management regimes to mitigate cross-sectoral externalities.

环境和自然资源使用外部性的标准方法通常集中于单一部门的资源和用户群体。补救措施包括Pigouvian式的政府限制，Elinor Ostrom之后的小组控制（或更不频繁），如罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）概述的那样，跨用户讨价还价。但是，许多困难的自然资源管理问题涉及跨多个异构部门对同一资源或多个相互依赖资源的竞争使用。产生了跨部门的外部性，并阻碍了保护目标的实现。资源和利益相关者的多样性，可能具有不同的财产权，拥有不同的使用或不使用价值，具有不同的传统或处于不同的监管制度之下，增加了发生多管辖权冲突的可能性。我们根据奥利弗·威廉姆森（Oliver Williamson）的四个层次的制度（社会嵌入度，制度环境，治理，资源分配）进行制度分析，以说明潜在冲突的根源，解决冲突的成本以及交流的潜力。在比较替代方法的成本时，我们包括与产权相关的交易成本；游说，实施和执行政府法规的成本；当资源问题涉及多个部门和不同种类的人口时，从小组控制中扩大规模的成本。在我们的示例案例中，非正规产权的工具以较低的交易成本进行交换。在结束时，我们将讨论如何改善帕累托岛的科阿森自愿交易协议，以降低成本，提高效率，