Purpose - This paper aims to investigate the role of certification in providing information and reducing market inefficiencies when the “certification process is imperfect”. In the setting, eco-labels imperfectly signal environmental product quality to consumers where the error in the process of certification could be either Type 1 or Type 2 error. The paper examines firms' incentive to get certified, equilibrium quantities and profits. The authors use perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept for the analysis. They then examine conditions for separating and pooling equilibrium to exist and welfare implications of certification process. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses a vertical product differentiated model where firms are competing in quantities. Consumers are unable to observe the environmental quality of the product. To signal the product quality to consumers, firms may adopt certification by a third party. Using a framework where certification process is imperfect, the paper derives conditions for Perfect Bayesian separating and pooling equilibrium to exist. Findings - The paper shows that the existence of separating and pooling equilibrium depends on the certification fee. A separating equilibrium, where one firm seeks certification and other firm does not seek certification exists for an intermediate value of certification fee. A pooling equilibrium, where both firms seek certification, exists only when the certification fee is sufficiently small. The paper shows conditions for the certification fee for which welfare will be higher under separating equilibrium as compared to pooling equilibrium and analyses welfare implications for subsidy policy for the certification fee. Originality/value - The paper contributes to the literature by examining the role of labelling under imperfect certification.

中文翻译：

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产品认证和生态标签不完善

目的——本文旨在调查当“认证过程不完善”时认证在提供信息和减少市场低效率方面的作用。在这种情况下，生态标签向消费者表明环境产品质量并不完美，认证过程中的错误可能是第 1 类或第 2 类错误。该论文考察了企业获得认证的动机、均衡数量和利润。作者使用完美贝叶斯均衡概念进行分析。然后，他们检查分离和合并均衡存在的条件以及认证过程的福利影响。设计/方法/方法 - 本文使用垂直产品差异化模型，其中公司在数量上进行竞争。消费者无法观察产品的环境质量。为了向消费者表明产品质量，公司可以采用第三方认证。使用认证过程不完善的框架，本文推导出完美贝叶斯分离和合并均衡存在的条件。调查结果 - 该论文表明，分离和合并均衡的存在取决于认证费用。一个分离均衡，其中一个公司寻求认证，而另一家公司不寻求认证，存在中间价值的认证费用。只有当认证费用足够少时，才存在联合均衡，即两家公司都寻求认证。本文展示了在分离均衡下福利会高于汇集均衡的认证费的条件，并分析了认证费补贴政策对福利的影响。原创性/价值 - 该论文通过检查标签在不完善认证下的作用为文献做出贡献。