We study the relation between independent director attention and the cost of equity capital. Masulis and Mobbs find that a director with multiple directorships distributes her time and effort (i.e., attention) unequally according to the relative prestige of each directorship. We investigate whether a firm's cost of equity capital reflects such unequal distribution of attention by its directors. We find that firms receiving more director attention are associated with a lower cost of equity capital. These firms also have higher accounting information quality. Moreover, the attention from audit committee directors matters more than that from other directors in reducing the cost of equity capital. Robustness checks show that the results are not driven by firm size. Overall, our evidence is consistent with director attention reducing the cost of equity capital through effective monitoring that increases accounting information quality.

中文翻译：

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独立董事的关注与权益资本成本

我们研究了独立董事注意力与权益资本成本之间的关系。Masulis 和 Mobbs 发现，拥有多个董事职位的董事根据每个董事职位的相对声望，分配她的时间和精力（即注意力）是不平等的。我们调查了公司的股权资本成本是否反映了其董事注意力的这种不平等分配。我们发现，获得更多董事关注的公司与较低的股权资本成本相关。这些公司的会计信息质量也较高。此外，审计委员会董事的关注在降低权益资本成本方面比其他董事的关注更重要。稳健性检验表明，结果不受公司规模的驱动。全面的，