We study the effects of coordinated and noncoordinated macroprudential policies in a core–periphery model that emphasizes the role of international financial centers. After documenting empirically the existence of cross-country macroprudential spillovers and policy interdependence, we derive a number of results. First, even absent financial frictions, self-oriented policymakers attempt to manipulate asset prices to their advantage, resulting in higher long-run capital taxes. Second, financial frictions generate a subsidization bias, as policymakers aim at eliminating the inefficiency wedge between the cost of capital and the deposit rate. Third, self-oriented national policies imply insufficient subsidies in the long run and wider efficiency gaps in the short run, resulting in substantial gains from cooperation.

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评估国际宏观审慎政策合作的收益

我们在强调国际金融中心作用的核心-外围模型中研究协调和非协调宏观审慎政策的影响。在实证记录跨国宏观审慎溢出效应和政策相互依存的存在之后，我们得出了一些结果。首先，即使没有金融摩擦，自我导向的决策者也会试图操纵资产价格以使其有利，从而导致更高的长期资本税。其次，金融摩擦会产生补贴偏差，因为政策制定者的目标是消除资本成本和存款利率之间的低效率楔子。第三，自主导向的国家政策，长期看补贴不足，短期看效率差距拉大，合作成果显着。