This paper uses a search model with Nash bargaining to identify various channels through which agent gender affects selling price and selling time in the resale market for houses. The theory is used in conjunction with the empirical model to infer agent bargaining power when dealing with the same or opposite sex agents on the other side of the transaction. The results reveal that sellers set higher listing prices when working with male agents, a pattern consistent with sellers’ ex ante beliefs that male agents enjoy greater expected bargaining power. Ex post agent bargaining power varies by sex and their role in the transaction. Female agents assisting buyers have stronger bargaining power when facing male listing agents than when facing female agents in rising or falling markets. The ex post bargaining power of male selling agents assisting buyers appears to be generally weaker than that of female listing agents.

本文使用带有Nash讨价还价的搜索模型来确定各种渠道，代理商性别通过这些渠道影响房屋转售市场中的售价和出售时间。该理论与经验模型结合使用，可以推论在交易另一端与同性或异性行为者打交道时的行为人讨价还价能力。结果表明，卖方在与男性特工合作时设定了更高的挂牌价格，这种模式与卖方先前认为男性特工享有更大的讨价还价能力的信念一致。事后代理商的议价能力因性别及其在交易中的角色而异。与在上升或下降的市场中面对女性经纪人时相比，协助买家的女性经纪人在面对男性上市代理人时具有更强的议价能力。