We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism \(\varphi \) satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering \(\succ \) such that \(\varphi \) is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and \(\succ \).

我们采用 Klaus 和 Nichifor（Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020）引入的一组机制，具有（个人）保留价格的系列独裁机制，以分配异构不可分割的对象，例如专科诊所预约。我们展示了具有同质不可分割对象保留价格的串行独裁机制的特征（Klaus 和 Nichifor 2020，定理 1）如何通过添加中立性来适应异构不可分割对象的分配：机制\(\varphi \)满足最小可交易性，个体理性,策略证明,一致性,未分配对象的独立性、中立性和非浪费性打破平局当且仅当存在保留价格向量r和优先排序\(\succ \)使得\(\varphi \)是具有保留价格的串行独裁机制基于r和\(\succ \)。