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Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence
Experimental Economics ( IF 2.387 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-14 , DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09702-1
Marco Castillo , Ahrash Dianat

We present experimental evidence on the interplay between strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms. In particular, we apply a version of risk-dominance to compare the riskiness of “truncation” against other strategies that secure against remaining unmatched. By keeping subjects’ ordinal preferences fixed while changing their cardinal representation, our experimental treatments vary the risk-dominant prediction. We find that both truth-telling and truncation are played more often when they are risk-dominant. In both treatments, however, truncation strategies are played more often in later rounds of the experiment. Our results also shed light on several open questions in market design.



中文翻译:

稳定匹配机制中的战略不确定性和均衡选择:实验证据

我们提供实验证据证明稳定匹配机制中战略不确定性与均衡选择之间的相互作用。尤其是,我们采用了风险主导的版本,将“截断”的风险与其他能够避免出现无法比拟的策略进行比较。通过在改变主体的基本表示的同时保持主体的序贯偏好不变,我们的实验方法改变了以风险为主导的预测。我们发现,以风险为主导的真相和截断都更常被使用。但是,在这两种处理中,截断策略在实验的后几轮中都更经常使用。我们的结果也揭示了市场设计中的几个未解决的问题。

更新日期:2021-02-15
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