This paper reviews academic literature related to the consequences that outside directors and boards may face in the wake of earnings restatements and suggests directions for future research. We examine loss of board seats; recruitment of new directors; proxy recommendations and shareholder support; pre-emptive director departures; director wealth effects; director reputation, litigation, and sanction risks; international evidence; and legal proposals for reform. The overall picture that emerges from the literature is that directors’ primary risk in the wake of earnings restatements is loss of board seats, in part through adverse proxy advisor recommendations and reduced shareholder support. Directors typically face little risk of legal liability or SEC sanctions, and some directors pre-emptively leave a problem company’s board and reduce their loss of interlocked board seats. Some legal scholars have called for director liability to be increased so as to promote more vigilant board oversight. Companies often focus on increasing the independence of the board in the wake of a restatement in an effort to repair organizational reputation. While researchers have revealed a host of important findings to date, much more can be learned about the effects of restatements on outside directors and boards.

本文回顾了有关收益重述后外部董事和董事会可能面临的后果的学术文献，并提出了未来研究的方向。我们检查董事会席位的损失；招聘新董事；代理推荐和股东支持；优先董事离任；董事财富效应；董事声誉，诉讼和制裁风险；国际证据；以及有关改革的法律建议。从文献中得出的总体情况是，在利润重述后，董事的主要风险是董事会席位的减少，部分原因是代理顾问建议不当以及股东支持减少。董事通常面临法律责任或SEC制裁的风险很小，并且一些董事可以优先离开有问题的公司董事会，并减少他们互锁的董事会席位的损失。一些法律学者呼吁增加董事责任，以提高对董事会的警惕。在重编报表后，公司通常会着重于提高董事会的独立性，以努力恢复组织声誉。尽管研究人员迄今已揭示了许多重要发现，但可以了解到有关重述对外部董事和董事会的影响的更多信息。