Many philosophers have appealed to the PSR in arguments for a being that exists a se, a being whose explanation is in itself. But what does it mean, exactly, for something to have its explanation ‘in itself’? Contemporary philosophers have said next to nothing about this, relying instead on phrases plucked from the accounts of various historical figures. In this article, I analyse five such accounts – those of Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz – and argue that none are satisfactory. Should we abandon or restrict the PSR, then? I think that would be hasty, for many reasons. I therefore consider the prospects of explaining everything, including God, given the constraints of certain features of good explanations, and conclude with several observations about future approaches.

中文翻译：

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上帝为什么存在？

许多哲学家在论证存在的存在时诉诸 PSR一个se，一个存在，其解释本身。但是，对于某事物“本身”有其解释，这究竟意味着什么？当代哲学家对此几乎一无所知，而是依靠从各种历史人物的叙述中摘录的短语。在本文中，我分析了五个这样的描述——安塞尔姆、阿奎那、笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎和莱布尼茨的描述——并认为没有一个是令人满意的。那么，我们应该放弃还是限制 PSR 呢？我认为这会很仓促，原因有很多。因此，鉴于良好解释的某些特征的限制，我考虑解释包括上帝在内的一切事物的前景，并以对未来方法的一些观察作为结论。