Can transitional justice enhance democratic representation in countries recovering from authoritarian rule? The authors argue that lustration, a policy that reveals secret collaboration with the authoritarian regime, can prevent former authoritarian elites from extorting policy concessions from past collaborators who have been elected as politicians in the new regime. Absent lustration, former elites can threaten to reveal information about past collaboration unless the politicians implement policies these elites desire. In this way, lustration policies enable politicians to avoid blackmail and to be responsive to their constituents, improving the quality of representation. The authors show that whether lustration enhances representation depends on its severity and the extent to which dissidents-turned-politicians would suffer if the skeletons in their closets were revealed. The authors also find that the potential to blackmail politicians increases as the ideological distance between authoritarian elites and politicians decreases. They test this theory with original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset, which spans eighty-four countries that transitioned to democracy since 1946.

中文翻译：

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过渡司法能否提高新民主国家的代表质量？

过渡时期司法能否增强从专制统治中恢复过来的国家的民主代表性？The authors argue that lustration, a policy that reveals secret collaboration with the authoritarian regime, can prevent former authoritarian elites from extorting policy concessions from past collaborators who have been elected as politicians in the new regime. 如果没有清洗，前精英可能会威胁要透露有关过去合作的信息，除非政客们实施这些精英所希望的政策。通过这种方式，清理政策使政客们能够避免敲诈勒索，并对选民做出回应，从而提高代表的质量。作者表明，清理是否能增强代表性取决于其严重程度以及如果他们壁橱里的骷髅被揭露，持不同政见者转变为政治家的痛苦程度。作者还发现，随着威权精英和政客之间意识形态距离的缩小，勒索政客的可能性会增加。他们使用来自全球过渡司法数据集的原始数据来检验这一理论，该数据集涵盖了自 1946 年以来过渡到民主的 84 个国家。