This paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgement. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgements of probability targeting epistemically modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming: (1) Moss (2015), in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of probability targeting a ‘proxy ’ proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief in the modal claim; (2) a model on which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of credence taking as their objects (non-propositional) modal representations (rather than proxy propositions). The second model, like Moss’s model, is shown to be semantically and mathematically tractable. The second model, however, can be straightforwardly integrated into a plausible model of the role of graded attitudes toward modal claims in cognition and normative epistemology.

中文翻译：

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分级模态判断

本文提出了一种新的分级模态判断模型。它首先对现象进行问题化：给定对认知模态逻辑的似是而非的约束，不可能将对模态主张的分级态度建模为针对认知模态命题的概率判断。本文考虑了两种替代模型，在这些模型上模态算子是非命题形成的：(1) Moss (2015)，其中对模态声明的分级态度表示为针对“代理”命题的概率判断，信念承保对模态索赔的信任；(2) 一种模型，在该模型上，对模态主张的分级态度被表示为以可信度的判断为对象（非命题）模态表征（而不是代理命题）。第二个模型，就像莫斯的模型，被证明是语义和数学上易于处理的。然而，第二个模型可以直接整合到一个关于认知和规范认识论中对模态声明的分级态度的作用的合理模型中。