In this article, I develop an Augustinian response to some contemporary philosophical proposals concerning the problem of weakness of will. I argue that many philosophers tend to cast the problem in terms of irrationality, focusing on psychological components such as judgment, desire, and resolution. In contrast, I contend that weakness of will has more to do with the absence of a coherent conception of practical identity and with a misleading conception of practical identity that overestimates the agent’s normative and motivational capacities. I claim that the irrationality of the weak-willed agent is at best a symptom, rather than the ultimate source, of weakness of will which cannot be properly understood without first addressing the deficiency of our internal resources relative to our willing and doing.

中文翻译：

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意志和实际认同的弱点

在这篇文章中，我对一些关于意志薄弱问题的当代哲学建议做出了奥古斯丁式的回应。我认为，许多哲学家倾向于从非理性的角度来看待问题，关注诸如判断、欲望和决心等心理因素。相比之下，我认为意志的薄弱更多地与缺乏一致的实践身份概念以及高估代理人的规范和动机能力的误导性实践身份概念有关。我声称意志薄弱者的非理性充其量只是意志薄弱的一种症状，而不是最终的根源，如果不首先解决与我们的意愿和行为相关的内部资源的不足，就无法正确理解意志薄弱。