foreseeing a side effect makes it voluntary but that the norms governing causing or allowing harm voluntarily are less strict than those governing intentional acts of harming. This is so especially when the agent, through no fault of her own, cannot but voluntarily cause or allow harm (as in some trolley cases). My point is not to assert that this theory of intentional action is correct but to note that Masek’s treatment of intention presupposes several decisions in action theory that he does not explicitly discuss. As a result, I suspect, his defense of an agent-based theory of intention will fail to persuade those not already sympathetic to it. Despite this concern, and those outlined earlier about his defense of the Socratic principle, Masek’s book is a valuable contribution to the specialist literature on PDE. His defense of PDE is novel and creative, and he expands our conception of how it can be related to wider issues in ethical theory.

中文翻译：

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书评：雪莉·兰博，重生伤口：生活在创伤的来世

预见到副作用使其成为自愿的，但管理造成或允许自愿伤害的规范不如管理故意伤害行为的规范那么严格。尤其是当代理人并非由于她自己的过错而不得不自愿造成或允许伤害时（如在某些手推车案件中）。我的观点不是断言这种意向行为理论是正确的，而是要指出，马塞克对意向的处理以他没有明确讨论的行为理论中的几个决定为前提。结果，我怀疑，他对基于代理的意图理论的辩护将无法说服那些还没有同情它的人。尽管有这种担忧，以及之前概述的他对苏格拉底原理的辩护，马塞克的书对偏微分方程的专业文献做出了宝贵的贡献。