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Antitheodicy and the Grading of Theodicies by Moral Offensiveness
Sophia Pub Date : 2020-08-11 , DOI: 10.1007/s11841-020-00765-w
James Franklin

Antitheodicy objects to all attempts to solve the problem of evil. Its objections are almost all on moral grounds—it argues that the whole project of theodicy is morally offensive. Trying to excuse God’s permission of evil is said to deny the reality of evil, to exhibit gross insensitivity to suffering, and to insult the victims of grave evils. Since antitheodicists urge the avoidance of theodicies for moral reasons, it is desirable to evaluate the moral reasons against theodicies in abstraction from the intellectual reasons for and against them. It is argued that the best known theodicies such as those based on soul-making and free will are guilty of moral faults as alleged. But Leibniz’s best of all possible worlds theory, often thought to be the most morally offensive ‘Panglossian’ theodicy, is morally blameless because it excuses God by the absolute impossibility of his choosing any world better than the present one. Theodicy should not be conceived of as a search for greater goods which may excuse God’s permitting evils. From the divine point of view, creation is an upfront choice between scenarios—in modern parlance, a Trolley problem rather than a Transplant problem. In cases of forced choice among scenarios, it is morally improper to criticize one who chooses the best.

中文翻译:

反神正论和道德攻击性对神正论的分级

反神正论反对一切解决邪恶问题的尝试。它的反对意见几乎都是基于道德理由——它认为神正论的整个计划在道德上是冒犯的。试图为上帝允许邪恶开脱被认为是否认邪恶的现实,对苦难表现出严重的麻木不仁,并侮辱严重邪恶的受害者。由于反神学主义者出于道德原因敦促避免神学,因此最好从支持和反对道德的理性理由中抽象出道德理由与神学的对比。有人争辩说,最著名的神学,例如那些基于灵魂制造和自由意志的神学,都犯了所谓的道德错误。但是莱布尼茨最好的所有可能世界理论,通常被认为是最具道德攻击性的“庞洛西主义”神学,在道德上是无可指责的,因为它以上帝绝对不可能选择任何比现在更好的世界为由为他辩解。神正论不应该被认为是寻求更大的善,这可以作为上帝允许罪恶的借口。从神圣的角度来看,创造是场景之间的预先选择——用现代的话来说,是电车问题而不是移植问题。在场景之间被迫选择的情况下,批评选择最好的人在道德上是不合适的。
更新日期:2020-08-11
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