This paper examines interagency collaboration (IAC) among key security agencies and how this has impacted the counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Interagency collaboration is often perceived as a panacea for dealing with many complex social problems. But there still exists fogginess about the nature, triggers, and what determines results of interagency collaboration. This study focuses on these issues. We employed the complexity theory to argue that organizations are like complex adaptive systems (CAS) that can naturally be drawn to interdependence and connectivity in reaction to a shared problem. Weiss theory helps to explain the determinants as depending on available resources and the capacity of collaborating institutions. We conclude that despite the tendency towards conflict among the Nigerian security agencies, the initial failure of traditional approach of police and military brutality in quelling the insurrection led to a perception of a shared problem by the government and law enforcement agencies. However, resource and weak institutional capacity to mount collaboration largely explained why the counter-insurgency collaboration has not yielded the expected results.

中文翻译：

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机构间合作和管理尼日利亚针对博科圣地的反叛乱运动

本文研究了主要安全机构之间的机构间合作 (IAC)，以及这如何影响尼日利亚针对博科圣地叛乱的反叛乱运动。机构间合作通常被视为处理许多复杂社会问题的灵丹妙药。但是，对于机构间合作的性质、触发因素以及决定结果的因素，仍然存在迷雾。本研究重点关注这些问题。我们采用复杂性理论来论证组织就像复杂的自适应系统 (CAS)，可以自然地吸引到相互依赖和连接以应对共同的问题。Weiss 理论有助于将决定因素解释为取决于可用资源和合作机构的能力。我们得出的结论是，尽管尼日利亚安全机构之间存在冲突的趋势，但最初的警察和军事暴行导致起义的传统方法的失败导致政府和执法机构认为存在共同问题。然而，开展合作的资源和薄弱的机构能力在很大程度上解释了为什么反叛乱合作没有产生预期的结果。