In his recent book “Becoming Human” Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared intentionality (SI) account of uniquely human cognition. More so than in earlier writings, the author embraces the idea that SI shapes not just our social cognition but all domains of thought and emotion. In this critical essay, we center on three parts of his theory. The first is that children allegedly have to earn the status of “second persons” through the acquisition of collective intentionality at age 3. We make the case that humans take a second-personal stance toward others even as infants. The second point concerns Tomasello’s claim that 3-year-olds are group-minded and think in terms of “us” vs. “them”. We doubt both that children this young have a clear overview of their in- and out-groups and that they possess the “agonistic spirit” necessary for inter-group competition. Third, due to his focus on collective intentionality and how it might explain 3-year-olds’ difficulties with theory of mind problems, Tomasello appears to pay less attention to the crucial conceptual change that allows 4- to 5-year-olds to master such tasks.

迈克尔·托马塞洛（Michael Tomasello）在他的最新著作《成为人类》中提供了他对人类独特认知的共同意图（SI）叙述的更新版本。与以前的著作相比，作者更喜欢SI不仅塑造我们的社会认知，而且塑造思想和情感的所有领域的思想。在这篇批评性文章中，我们集中讨论了他理论的三个部分。首先，据称儿童必须在3岁时通过获得集体意图而获得“第二人称”的身份。我们提出了这样的论据，即人类在婴儿时也对他人采取第二人称的态度。第二点与托马塞洛的说法有关，即三岁的孩子具有集体意识，并以“我们”对“他们”的方式思考。我们都怀疑这个年幼的孩子对他们的内外群体有清晰的认识，以及他们是否具有群体间竞争所必需的“斗志”。第三，由于他专注于集体意向性及其如何解释三岁儿童的心理问题，托马塞洛似乎对使四岁至五岁儿童掌握知识的关键概念变化的关注较少。这样的任务。