Recently, a view I refer to as “hypothetical continuism” has garnered some favour among philosophers, based largely on empirical research showing substantial neurocognitive overlaps between episodic memory and imagination. According to this view, episodically remembering past events is the same kind of cognitive process as sensorily imagining future and counterfactual events. In this paper, I first argue that hypothetical continuism is false, on the basis of substantive epistemic asymmetries between episodic memory and the relevant kinds of imagination. However, I then propose and defend an alternative form of continuism, according to which episodic memory is continuous with a capacity I call “actuality-oriented imagination.” Because of the deep epistemic affinities between episodic memory and actuality-oriented imagination, it makes sense to think of them as cognitive processes of the same kind.

最近，我称之为“假设连续性”的观点在哲学家中赢得了一些青睐，主要是基于经验研究，该研究表明情节记忆和想象力之间存在着大量的神经认知重叠。根据这种观点，在记忆上回忆过去的事件与感觉上想象未来和反事实的事件是同一种认知过程。在本文中，我首先根据情节记忆与相关类型的想象之间的实质性认知不对称，提出假设连续性是错误的。但是，我然后提出并捍卫了一种连续性的替代形式，根据这种形式，情节性记忆是连续的，具有我称之为“面向事实的想象力”的能力。由于情节记忆与面向现实的想象力之间在认识上有着深厚的渊源，