Analytic narratives (ANs) are case studies of historical events and/or institutions that are formed by the combination of the narrative method characteristic of historical and historiographical works with analytic tools, especially game theory, traditionally used in economics and political science. The purpose of this article is to give a philosophy-of-science view of the relevance of analytical narratives for institutional analysis. The main claim is that the AN methodology is especially appealing in the context of a non-behaviorist and non-reductionist account of institutions. Such an account is fully compatible with the “rules-in-equilibrium” view of institutions. On this basis, two supporting claims are made: first, I argue that within analytical narrative, game-theoretic models play a key role in the identification of institutional mechanisms as the explanans for economic phenomena, the latter being irreducible to so-called “micro-foundations.” Second, I claim that the “rules-in-equilibrium” view of institutions provides justification for the importance given to non-observables in the institutional analysis. Hence, institutional analysis building on analytical narrative typically emphasizes the role of derived (i.e., nondirectly observed) intentional states (preferences, intentions, beliefs).

中文翻译：

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历史，分析性叙事和制度的平衡规则观

分析叙事（AN）是对历史事件和/或机构的案例研究，这些历史事件和/或制度是通过将历史和史学作品的叙事方法特征与分析工具（尤其是博弈论）相结合而形成的，传统上用于经济学和政治学。本文的目的是就分析叙事与制度分析的相关性提供一种科学哲学的观点。主要主张是，在机构的非行为主义者和非还原主义者的论述中，AN方法特别有吸引力。这样的账目完全符合机构的“均衡规则”观点。在此基础上，提出了两个支持性的主张：首先，我认为在分析性叙述中，博弈论模型在识别制度机制方面起着关键作用，制度机制是对经济现象的解释，而后者对于所谓的“微观基础”是无法简化的。第二，我主张制度的“均衡规则”观点为制度分析中非可观察因素的重要性提供了理由。因此，建立在分析叙事基础上的制度分析通常强调派生（即，非直接观察到）的有意状态（偏好，意图，信念）的作用。