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Expert Knowledge by Perception
Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-05-29 , DOI: 10.1017/s0031819120000157
Madeleine Ransom

Does the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form.

中文翻译:

感知专家知识

人们可以在感知的基础上形成的信念范围是固定不变的,还是可以通过学习来扩大?这个问题的答案对于我们理解为什么以及何时应该信任专家以及评估认知基础主义的合理性很重要。感知专业知识的实证研究表明,专家确实可以通过学习来丰富他们的感知经验。然而,这并不能解决他们信仰的认知地位。有人可能会认为专家的背景知识是他们丰富的知觉经验的原因——这就是所谓的认知渗透——因此他们随后的信念只是中介地证明了,因为他们在认知上依赖于这种背景知识。我反对这种观点。知觉专长不是认知渗透的结果,而是知觉学习的结果,而知觉学习并不以需要认知渗透的方式涉及认知。因此,感知专业知识提供了一种扩大专家可以形成的直接合理信念范围的方法。
更新日期:2020-05-29
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