当前位置: X-MOL 学术Philosophy Compass › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Teaching & learning guide for: The relationship between belief and credence
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2020-06-01 , DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12670
Elizabeth Jackson 1
Affiliation  

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief on, or disbelieve a proposition. This belief framework underlies traditional epistemology. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. The credence framework is utilized in formal epistemology. But how do belief and credence relate to each other? Two types of connections have been proposed: descriptive and normative. Descriptively, one attitude might reduce to the other, or both attitudes may be equally fundamental. Normatively, the most commonlyposited connection between belief and credence is called The Lockean Thesis, on which rational belief is rational credence above some threshold. Various objections have been raised to both normative and descriptive connections between the attitudes, causing some to affirm that the attitudes are independent.

中文翻译:

教与学指南:信念与信任之间的关系

作者的介绍有时,认识论者会对信念进行理论化,这种信念是一种三方态度,在这种态度上,人们可以相信,不相信或不相信一个主张。这种信念框架是传统认识论的基础。在另一些情况下,认识论者对信任度进行理论化,信任度是一种细粒度的态度,代表了人们对命题的主观概率或置信度。信任框架用于形式认识论中。但是信仰和信任如何相互联系?已经提出了两种类型的联系:描述性联系和规范联系。从描述上讲,一种态度可能会降低为另一种态度,或者两种态度都可能同样重要。在规范上,信念和信任之间最常见的联系称为The Lockean Thesis,理性信念是某种程度以上的理性信任。对于态度之间的规范性和描述性联系都提出了各种反对意见,使一些人断言态度是独立的。
更新日期:2020-06-01
down
wechat
bug