Moore supposedly discovered that there are sentences of a certain form that, though they can be true, no rational human being can sincerely and truly utter any of them. MC and MO are particular instances: In this paper, I show that there are sentences of the same form as MC and MO that can be sincerely and truly uttered by rational agents. We call sentences of the same form as MC and MO “Moorean Sentences”. In Part II, we go over a standard argument for why sentences of the same form as MC and MO cannot be sincerely and truly uttered, and we explain why this argument is unsound. In explaining why this argument is unsound, we rely on the context-sensitivity of belief-reports and show that the premises of the argument are not all true in the same context. We then employ a general theory of belief reports that incorporates guises to explain why our examples are sincerely utterable while Moore’s sentences are typically not sincerely utterable. The answer will turn on the suggestion that belief reports carry a hidden quantifier over guises, where the domain of quantification is determined by context. We conclude with general lessons about Moore’s Paradox and the supposed limits of first-person belief reports.

中文翻译：

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说摩尔式句子和信念报告的语用学

摩尔据说发现有某种形式的句子，虽然它们可能是真的，但没有一个理性的人可以真诚地说出其中的任何一个。MC 和 MO 是特例：在本文中，我展示了与 MC 和 MO 形式相同的句子，可以由理性主体真诚地说出。我们称与 MC 和 MO 形式相同的句子为“Moorean Sentences”。在第二部分，我们回顾了为什么与 MC 和 MO 形式相同的句子不能真诚地说出的标准论证，并解释为什么这个论证是不合理的。在解释为什么这个论证不合理时，我们依赖于信念报告的上下文敏感性，并表明论证的前提在相同的上下文中并非都是正确的。然后，我们采用了一种普遍的信念报告理论，其中结合了伪装来解释为什么我们的例子是真诚的，而摩尔的句子通常不是真诚的。答案将基于以下建议：信念报告在伪装上带有隐藏的量词，其中量化的域由上下文决定。我们以关于摩尔悖论和第一人称信念报告的假定限制的一般课程结束。