I show that centered propositions—also called de se propositions, and usually modeled as sets of centered worlds—pose a serious problem for various versions of Lewis’s Principal Principle. The problem, put roughly, is that in scenarios like Elga’s ‘Sleeping Beauty’ case, those principles imply that rational agents ought to have obviously irrational credences. To solve the problem, I propose a centered version of the Principal Principle. My version allows centered propositions to be objectively chancy.

中文翻译：

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居中原则

我展示了中心命题——也称为 de se 命题，通常被建模为中心世界的集合——对刘易斯主要原理的各种版本构成了一个严重的问题。问题，粗略地说，是在像 Elga 的“睡美人”案例这样的场景中，这些原则意味着理性的代理人应该有明显的非理性的信任。为了解决这个问题，我提出了一个中心化的主要原则。我的版本允许中心命题客观上是偶然的。