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Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable
Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2020-07-18 , DOI: 10.1007/s11098-020-01507-x David Enoch
Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2020-07-18 , DOI: 10.1007/s11098-020-01507-x David Enoch
This paper responds to a recently popular objection to non-naturalist, robust moral realism. The objection is that moral realism is morally objectionable, because realists are committed to taking evidence about the distribution (or non-existence) of non-natural properties to be relevant to their first-order moral commitments. I argue that such objections fail. The moral realist is indeed committed to conditionals such as “If there are no non-natural properties, then no action is wrong.” But the realist is not committed to using this conditional in a modus-ponens inference upon coming to believe its antecedent. Placing the discussion in a wider epistemological discussion—here, that of “junk-knowledge”, and of how background knowledge determines the relevance of purported evidence—shows that this objection does not exert a price from the realist.
中文翻译:
谢谢,我们很好:为什么道德现实主义在道德上并不令人反感
这篇论文回应了最近流行的对非自然主义的、稳健的道德现实主义的反对。反对意见是,道德实在论在道德上是令人反感的,因为实在论者致力于取证关于非自然属性的分布(或不存在)与他们的一阶道德承诺相关。我认为这样的反对是失败的。道德现实主义者确实致力于诸如“如果没有非自然属性,则没有任何行为是错误的”之类的条件。但是现实主义者并不致力于在相信其先行条件后在模态推理中使用这个条件。将讨论放在更广泛的认识论讨论中——这里是“垃圾知识”,以及背景知识如何决定所谓证据的相关性——表明这种反对不会对现实主义者施加代价。
更新日期:2020-07-18
中文翻译:
谢谢,我们很好:为什么道德现实主义在道德上并不令人反感
这篇论文回应了最近流行的对非自然主义的、稳健的道德现实主义的反对。反对意见是,道德实在论在道德上是令人反感的,因为实在论者致力于取证关于非自然属性的分布(或不存在)与他们的一阶道德承诺相关。我认为这样的反对是失败的。道德现实主义者确实致力于诸如“如果没有非自然属性,则没有任何行为是错误的”之类的条件。但是现实主义者并不致力于在相信其先行条件后在模态推理中使用这个条件。将讨论放在更广泛的认识论讨论中——这里是“垃圾知识”,以及背景知识如何决定所谓证据的相关性——表明这种反对不会对现实主义者施加代价。