An increasingly popular view in the literature on rationality attempts to vindicate the strong normativity of rationality by giving a unifying account of rational requirements and what one ought to do in terms of reasons that fall within one’s perspective. In this paper, I pose a dilemma for such a view: one’s rationality is determined by a narrower set of reasons, such as the set of reasons that one is attending to, whereas what one ought to do is determined by a broader set of reasons that comprises reasons one is not attending to. Thus, no single set of reasons can play the dual role of determining what one is rationally required to do and determining what one ought to do: either it is too broad to determine what one is rationally required to do or it is too narrow to determine what one ought to do.

中文翻译：

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两个角色的原因：离婚的原因？

关于理性的文献中越来越流行的一种观点试图通过统一说明理性要求以及人们应该根据属于自己观点的理由做什么来证明理性的强烈规范性。在这篇论文中，我为这样的观点提出了一个困境：一个人的理性是由一组较窄的原因决定的，例如一个人正在关注的一组原因，而一个人应该做什么是由一组更广泛的原因决定的这包括人们不注意的原因。因此，没有任何单一的理由可以起到决定一个人被合理要求做什么和决定一个人应该做什么的双重作用：要么太宽泛而无法确定一个人被合理要求做什么，要么太狭隘而无法确定一个人应该做什么。