In ‘Strategic Justice’, Vanderschraaf argues that many existing theories of justice as mutual advantage, including Hume’s, are not ‘proper accounts of justice’ because they deny the benefits of justice to people who are unable to contribute to the cooperative surplus. Vanderschraaf presents a model in which a practice of giving aid to vulnerable people can be a convention, and argues that this exemplifies justice as mutual advantage. I argue that this convention is not mutually advantageous. According to Hume’s theory, it creates moral obligations of humanity but not of justice.

中文翻译：

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休谟的正义论与范德施拉夫的脆弱性反对

在“战略正义”中，范德施拉夫认为，许多现有的互利正义理论，包括休谟的，都不是“正义的正确解释”，因为它们否认无法为合作盈余做出贡献的人获得正义的好处。Vanderschraaf 提出了一个模型，其中向弱势群体提供援助的做法可以成为惯例，并认为这将正义作为互利的例证。我认为这种约定不是互利的。根据休谟的理论，它创造了人类的道德义务，而不是正义。