As is well-known, David Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation is subject to serious counterexamples in ‘exceptional’ cases. What has not received due attention in the literature so far is that Lewis’ theory fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for causation in ‘ordinary’ cases, too. In particular, the theory suffers from the ‘problem of large causes’. It is argued that this problem may be fixed by imposing a minimization constraint, whilst this solution brings along substantial costs as well. In particular, a precise formulation of minimization requires defining an ‘essential part of an event’ and/or an ‘essential subevent’. Although the possibility of such a definition is ultimately left open, some doubts are raised on whether the counterfactualists’ resources are fit for this purpose, and whether the challenge can be met without substantially departing from Lewis’ intention, which was to provide a reductive account of causation.

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因果关系的反事实理论和大原因问题

众所周知，大卫刘易斯的因果关系反事实理论在“例外”情况下受到严重反例的影响。迄今为止，在文献中没有得到应有关注的是，刘易斯的理论也未能为“普通”案件中的因果关系提供充分必要条件。特别是，该理论受到“大因问题”的困扰。有人认为，这个问题可以通过施加最小化约束来解决，而这个解决方案也会带来大量成本。特别是，最小化的精确表述需要定义“事件的基本部分”和/或“基本子事件”。虽然这样一个定义的可能性最终没有定论，但对反事实主义者的资源是否适合这一目的提出了一些怀疑，