I have a clear idea of what it means that I have experiences in the past or future, and it does not seem to mean that experiences take place that possess certain content-characteristics, but simply and irreducibly that I experience them – i.e. that they are, at the time of their occurrence, experientially present to me –, whatever their contents may be. So the central question regarding personal identity is: What is this “I” to whom the experiences are present, and what is the nature of its identity across changing experiences? Following Zahavi, I suggest that the subject is not to be conceived as a merely postulated trans-experiential entity but has its very being in experiential presence itself. Yet the question is how to conceive of this presence. When we understand it as a property or quality of the experiences (as Zahavi seems to do), the problem is that every experience that has ever been experienced possesses this property, and so it cannot account for what it means that some experiences are experienced by me and not some other subject. In contrast, I suggest (following Klawonn’s “I-dimension” theory) understanding experiential presence not as a property of the experiences but as a dimension which is able to comprise many experiences and to abide as identical through their change – an idea that can also be found in some formulations of Zahavi’s, but which he does not distinguish with the necessary clarity from the quality account.

我对过去或将来的经历有一个清晰的认识，这似乎并不意味着经历的经历具有某些内容特征，而我却无法避免地简单而不可避免地体验到它们，即它们是，无论它们的内容如何，在它们发生时，都经验地呈现给我。因此，有关个人身份的核心问题是：这是谁给的“我”这些经验是存在的，在不断变化的经验中其身份的本质是什么？在扎哈维之后，我建议这个主题不应被视为仅仅是假定的跨经验实体，而其本身本身就存在于经验之中。但是问题是如何构想这种存在。当我们将其理解为体验的属性或质量时（如Zahavi看来），问题在于曾经经历过的每个体验都具有该属性，因此它无法解释某些体验是由人来体验的。我而不是其他主题。相比之下，我建议（按照克劳翁的“ I维”理论），将体验存在理解为体验的属性，而不是作为体验的一个属性，而是一个能够包含许多体验并通过改变而保持一致的维度，这种想法也可以可以在Zahavi的某些公式中找到，但是他并没有从质量说明中清楚地区分它们。