Hubert Dreyfus once noted that it would be difficult to ascertain whether Edmund Husserl had a computational theory of mind. I provide evidence that he had one. Both Steven Pinker and Steven Horst think that the computational theory of mind must have two components: a representational-symbolic component and a causal component. Bearing this in mind, we proceed to a close-reading of the sections of “On the Logic of Signs” wherein Husserl presents, if I’m correct, his computational theory of mind embedded in a language of thought. My argument goes like this: the computational theory of mind is the idea, following Haugeland, that the mind comes prepackaged as, or is endogenously constrained to be (with respect to certain domains), an automatic formal system; this explains, according to Husserl, why automatic trains of thought without logical intent resemble arguments exhibiting deductive structure with logical intent. In general, an automatic formal system yields true results provided that (1) the syntactic symbols with which they compute are univocal and are semantically evaluable, and (2) the mechanized inferences they perform are valid and preserve truth. These two conditions describe a computational (as opposed to an associative) cognitive process: the first condition connects representations to syntax (corresponding to Pinker and Horst’s first component), and the second condition uses the syntax, in inauthentic judging, to arrive at true conclusions through blind causality (corresponding to Pinker and Horst’s second component). Now, in point of textual fact, these are the conditions which Husserl attributes to our “natural psychological mechanism of symbolic inference” which typically yields true results. Since a formal system attributed to the “internal structure” of the mind, and guided by blind causality, just is the computational theory of mind, it follows, I think, that Husserl had a computational theory of mind. This computational theory is, moreover, embedded in a language of thought, since Husserl attributes a language-like form to our thoughts so that they may be mechanically processed. I conclude with a discussion of my results.

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心理过程如何保存真理？胡塞尔对心理计算理论的发现

休伯特·德雷福斯 (Hubert Dreyfus) 曾指出，很难确定埃德蒙·胡塞尔 (Edmund Husserl) 是否有心智计算理论。我提供证据证明他有一个。史蒂文·平克和史蒂文·霍斯特都认为心理计算理论必须有两个组成部分：表征符号组成部分和因果组成部分。考虑到这一点，我们继续仔细阅读“论符号逻辑”的章节，胡塞尔在这些章节中提出，如果我是对的，他的心智计算理论嵌入在一种思想语言中。我的论点是这样的：在 Haugeland 之后，心智的计算理论是这样一种想法，即心智被预先包装为或被内生地限制为（就某些领域而言）自动形式系统；这解释了，根据胡塞尔的说法，为什么没有逻辑意图的自动思维序列类似于展示具有逻辑意图的演绎结构的论证。一般来说，一个自动形式系统会产生真实的结果，前提是（1）它们计算的句法符号是单一的并且在语义上是可评估的，以及（2）它们执行的机械化推理是有效的并且保持真实。这两个条件描述了一个计算（相对于联想）认知过程：第一个条件将表征与句法联系起来（对应于平克和霍斯特的第一个成分），第二个条件在不真实的判断中使用句法得出真实的结论通过盲目的因果关系（对应于平克和霍斯特的第二个组成部分）。现在，就文本事实而言，这些是胡塞尔归因于我们“符号推理的自然心理机制”的条件，通常会产生真实的结果。既然归因于心灵“内部结构”的形式系统，并以盲目的因果关系为指导，正是心灵的计算理论，因此我认为，胡塞尔有一个心灵的计算理论。此外，这种计算理论嵌入在一种思想语言中，因为胡塞尔将一种类似语言的形式归于我们的思想，以便它们可以被机械地处理。我最后讨论了我的结果。胡塞尔有一个计算的心智理论。此外，这种计算理论嵌入在一种思想语言中，因为胡塞尔将一种类似语言的形式归因于我们的思想，以便它们可以被机械地处理。我最后讨论了我的结果。胡塞尔有一个计算的心智理论。此外，这种计算理论嵌入在一种思想语言中，因为胡塞尔将一种类似语言的形式归因于我们的思想，以便它们可以被机械地处理。我最后讨论了我的结果。