Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny (Language and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of language. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1999) argue that the pure causal theory of reference faces a problem, which they call the qua-problem. They propose to invoke intentional states to cope with it. Martin Kusch (A sceptical guide to meaning and rules. Acumen, Chesham, 2006), however, argues that, because Devitt and Stereleny invoke intentional states to solve the problem, their causal-hybrid theory of reference is susceptible to Kripke’s sceptical attack. Kusch thinks that intentional states are what allows the sceptic to get a foothold and thus interpret words in a weird way. In his view, Kripke is therefore correct in not regarding a causal theory as a solution to the problem. I think, however, that there is room to defend a causal-hybrid theory of reference. Drawing on Husserl’s notion of the life-world, I argue that this notion is helpful for overcoming some aspects of the qua-problem and the meaning scepticism which Devitt and Sterelny’s causal-hybrid theory of reference faces.

中文翻译：

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qua-problem、意义怀疑论和生活世界

Michael Devitt 和 Kim Sterelny（语言与现实：语言哲学导论。麻省理工学院出版社，剑桥，1999 年）认为，纯因果关系理论面临着一个问题，他们称之为准问题。他们建议调用有意状态来应对它。然而，Martin Kusch（对意义和规则的怀疑指南。Acumen，Chesham，2006 年）认为，因为 Devitt 和 Stereleny 调用有意状态来解决问题，他们的因果混合参考理论容易受到 Kripke 的怀疑攻击。Kusch 认为有意的状态让怀疑论者站稳脚跟，从而以一种奇怪的方式解释单词。因此，在他看来，克里普克没有将因果理论视为问题的解决方案是正确的。然而，我认为有空间来捍卫因果混合参考理论。