This paper examines Hobbes’s criticisms of Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments in light of Hobbes’s account in De Corpore and De Homine of the relationship of natural philosophy to geometry. I argue that Hobbes’s criticisms rely upon his understanding of what counts as “true physics.” Instead of seeing Hobbes as defending natural philosophy as “a causal enterprise … [that] as such, secured total and irrevocable assent,”1 I argue that, in his disagreement with Boyle, Hobbes relied upon his understanding of natural philosophy as a mixed mathematical science. In a mixed mathematical science one can mix facts from experience (the ‘that’) with causal principles borrowed from geometry (the ‘why’). Hobbes’s harsh criticisms of Boyle’s philosophy, especially in the Dialogus Physicus, sive De natura aeris (1661; hereafter Dialogus Physicus), should thus be understood as Hobbes advancing his view of the proper relationship of natural philosophy to geometry in terms of mixing principles from geometry with facts from experience. Understood in this light, Hobbes need not be taken to reject or diminish the importance of experiment/experience; nor should Hobbes’s criticisms in Dialogus Physicus be understood as rejecting experimenting as ignoble and not befitting a philosopher. Instead, Hobbes’s viewpoint is that experiment/experience must be understood within its proper place – it establishes the ‘that’ for a mixed mathematical science explanation.

中文翻译：

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霍布斯-博伊尔辩论中的自然哲学、演绎和几何

这篇论文根据霍布斯在 De Corpore 和 De Homine 中关于自然哲学与几何关系的叙述，检验了霍布斯对罗伯特·波义耳的空气泵实验的批评。我认为霍布斯的批评依赖于他对“真正的物理学”的理解。我没有将霍布斯视作捍卫自然哲学为“因果事业……[那样]，获得了完全和不可撤销的同意”1，我认为，在他与波义耳的不同意见中，霍布斯依赖于他将自然哲学理解为一种混合数学科学。在混合数学科学中，人们可以将经验中的事实（“那个”）与从几何学借来的因果原理（“为什么”）混合在一起。霍布斯对波义耳哲学的严厉批评，尤其是在 Dialogus Physicus, sive De natura aeris（1661；以下简称 Dialogus Physicus）中，因此，应该被理解为霍布斯通过将几何原理与经验事实相结合，推进了他对自然哲学与几何的适当关系的看法。从这个角度来理解，霍布斯不必被视为拒绝或削弱实验/经验的重要性；也不应将霍布斯在 Dialogus Physicus 中的批评理解为拒绝实验，认为实验是卑鄙的，不适合哲学家。相反，霍布斯的观点是必须在适当的位置理解实验/经验——它为混合数学科学解释建立了“那个”。不必认为霍布斯拒绝或削弱实验/经验的重要性；也不应将霍布斯在 Dialogus Physicus 中的批评理解为拒绝实验，认为实验是卑鄙的，不适合哲学家。相反，霍布斯的观点是必须在适当的位置理解实验/经验——它为混合数学科学解释建立了“那个”。不必认为霍布斯拒绝或削弱实验/经验的重要性；也不应将霍布斯在 Dialogus Physicus 中的批评理解为拒绝实验，认为实验是卑鄙的，不适合哲学家。相反，霍布斯的观点是必须在适当的位置理解实验/经验——它为混合数学科学解释建立了“那个”。