Abstract Based on the literature on decentralization, this article investigates the institutional arrangement and autonomy of local governments in Tigray Regional state. It is based on two rounds of field work covering nine districts. At a formal level, local governments are autonomous units with some defined mandates including power to decide on policy issues. In reality however, local governments in the study area act more as deconcentrated than as autonomous units since their autonomy is curtailed by higher level governments and party structures. Local governments are thus extension arms of the regional state with little autonomy of their own. Institutions such as elected councils, mayors and the executive exist at the local level but there is more vertical than horizontal accountability. As a result, local Councils have not been able to ensure accountability. Thus decentralization has not resulted in popular control of local governance and local-level development as interests of the party and the local political elite prevail over popular interests. The article calls for rethinking the design of local government that would constitute a local government deal that shifts decision-making away from higher level institutions to the local level, constituting multi-stake holders having control over the affairs of local government.

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埃塞俄比亚地方权力下放：蒂格里州立州案例研究

摘要本文基于权力下放的文献，对提格里州州政府的体制安排和自治进行了研究。它基于涵盖九个地区的两轮现场工作。在正式级别上，地方政府是自治单位，具有一些明确的任务授权，包括决定政策问题的权力。然而，实际上，研究区的地方政府比自治单位更分散，因为它们的自治受到上级政府和政党结构的限制。因此，地方政府是该地区国家的扩展部门，几乎没有自治权。机构如民选议会，市长和地方一级行政机关存在但不是水平的问责制更加垂直的。因此，地方议会无法确保问责制。因此，由于政党和地方政治精英的利益凌驾于人民利益之上，因此权力下放并没有导致人民对地方治理和地方发展的控制。文章呼吁重新考虑地方政府的设计，这将构成地方政府协议，从而将决策从上级机构转移到地方一级，从而构成对地方政府事务具有控制权的多利益相关者。