Abstract In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that morality obliges us to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. I argue, however, that in two late essays – “The End of All Things” and “On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” – Kant provides moral counterarguments to that position: these beliefs undermine moral agency by giving rise to fanaticism or fatalism. Thus, I propose, the Kantian position on the justification of religious belief is ultimately antinomial. One ought, moreover, to understand Kant’s considered position concerning the immortality of the soul and the existence of God to be similar to that he proposes concerning the theoretical ideas of reason in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason: they are necessary as regulative ideas guiding moral action, not endorsed or even postulated as propositions. In other words, they are subject matters not of belief, but of hope.

中文翻译：

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现实理性的隐性矛盾与康德的希望宗教

摘要在对实践理性的批判中，康德认为道德迫使我们相信灵魂的永生和上帝的存在。但是，我认为，在后来的两篇文章中，“万物的终结”和“关于神庙中所有哲学审判的流产”，康德对此立场提出了道德上的反驳：这些信念通过引起狂热主义或宿命论。因此，我提出，康德在宗教信仰辩护上的立场最终是对立的。此外，应该理解康德关于灵魂永生和神的存在的深思熟虑的立场，与他在《纯粹理性批判的辩证法》附录中关于理性的理论思想所提出的观点相似：它们是必要的作为指导道德行为的监管思想，不被认可甚至不被认为是命题。换句话说，它们不是主题，而是信念。