Abstract I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).

中文翻译：

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康德在时间上的延展：体现的索引理想主义

摘要我捍卫我对时间延展的真正康德主义观点：时间不是对象，而是具体细节的人类视野。因此，时间取决于所体现的人类主体的存在。但是，它不依赖于确定为空间对象的那些主题。从适用于索引空间的现实主义“感知”概念开始（1），我继续需要时间持续时间的外部标准（2）。根据康德的《第二次经验比喻》，这些标准可以在运动和变化的概念和定律中找到（3）。然后，我从中看到了对于超验唯心主义的合理观念（4）。最后，为了支持我的康德结论，我主张特定时间扩展的先验主观性质（5）。