Abstract The paper examines Schiller’s argument concerning the subjective experience of adopting a morality based on Kantian principles. On Schiller’s view, such experience must be marked by a continuous struggle to suppress nature, because the moral law is a purely rational and categorically commanding law that addresses beings who are natural as well as rational. Essential for Schiller’s conclusion is the account he has of what it takes to follow the law, that is, the mental states and functions that encapsulate the idea of moral self contained in Kant’s ethics. Focusing on the fundamental psychological elements and processes to which Kant’s theory appeals and on which it depends to have application, the paper defends an alternative idea of moral self to the one Schiller attributes to Kant.

中文翻译：

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康德，席勒和道德自我的观念

摘要本文考察了席勒关于基于康德原则的采用道德的主观经验的论点。在席勒看来，这种经历必须以不懈地压制自然为特征，因为道德法则是纯粹理性的，绝对命令性的法则，既涉及自然界又具有理性。席勒得出结论的关键是他对遵守法律的要求的说明，即封装了康德道德中包含的道德自我观念的精神状态和功能。着眼于康德的理论吸引人的基本心理要素和过程以及它所依赖的心理学基础和过程，本文为康德的席勒所赋予的一种道德自我辩护。