Abstract The concept of human freedom developed by Schelling in the Freiheitsschrift (1809) prompted him to explore a new concept of time in his Weltalter project. Schelling proposes the ‘generic subjectivity of time’: Time must be understood not as a precondition of dynamism, but rather as an effect of dynamic agency. The articulation of time into its moments, ‘presence’, ‘past’, and ‘future’, is realized through the dynamic contributions (motion, causality, and action) of every single causally involved being. Schelling’s concept thus fundamentally differs from Kant’s concept of time. For Kant, change and dynamism are located in the sensible world, whereas time (as well as space) is the subjective form of our sensible intuition. As such, time must be seen as a precondition of change and dynamism for Kant.

中文翻译：

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时间条件下的自由？在《自由书》之后，谢林提出了新的时间观念

摘要谢林在《自由意志论》（Freiheitsschrift，1809年）中提出了人类自由的概念，这促使他在韦尔塔特计划中探索了新的时间概念。Schelling提出了“时间的一般主观性”：必须不将时间理解为活力的前提，而应将其理解为动态代理的作用。通过每个因果关系个体的动态贡献（运动，因果关系和行动），将时间表达为“存在”，“过去”和“未来”的时刻。因此，谢林的概念与康德的时间概念从根本上有所不同。对于康德来说，变化和活力位于理性的世界中，而时间（以及空间）是我们敏感直觉的主观形式。因此，必须把时间视为康德变革和活力的前提。