Abstract Kant speaks repeatedly about the relations between ends or aims and scientific research, but the topic has mostly been ignored. What is the role of ends, especially (though not exclusively) practical ones, in his views on science? I will show that while Kant leaves ample space for recognizing a function of ends both in the definition and the pursuit of inquiry, and in the further practical application of scientific cognition, he does not claim that science is simply an instrument for achieving practical ends. I explain his complex conception, pointing out that Kant argues (1) that the sciences require ends for their very definition, (2) that ends come in fundamentally different kinds, (3) that the relation between science and ends requires the rational determination and hierarchization of all our ends, with “wisdom” as the highest, and (4) that this determination and hierarchization – which ought to be done by metaphysics – has itself to be carried out in a “scientific way”. I show further that (5) Kant gives sui generis weight to the epistemic aims and standards of science and to the autonomy of science from our practical lives. This places his position between separatism and anti-separatism with regard to the relation between science and our ends or values.

中文翻译：

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康德在科学的尽头

摘要康德曾多次谈到目标或目的与科学研究之间的关系，但这个话题几乎被忽略了。目的，特别是（尽管不是唯一的）实践目的在他对科学的看法中起什么作用？我将表明，尽管康德在定义和追求探究以及科学认知的进一步实际应用中都留有足够的空间来认识目的的功能，但他并不主张科学仅仅是实现目的的工具。我解释了他的复杂概念，并指出康德（1）认为科学需要对其定义进行定义；（2）终结具有根本不同的种类；（3）科学与终结之间的关系需要理性确定和以“智慧”为最高，实现我们所有目标的等级化，（4）这种确定和层次化（应该由形而上学来完成）本身必须以“科学的方式”进行。我进一步证明（5）康德特别重视科学的认识论目标和标准以及实践生活中科学的自主性。关于科学与我们的目标或价值观之间的关系，这使他处于分离主义与反分离主义之间。