Abstract I begin by commenting on Kant’s conception of analytic judgements. I then turn to Frege’s notion of analyticity. I argue that his definition of analytic truth in terms of provability from logical axioms and definitions is incomplete. The requisite analyticity of the logical axioms and the definitions, and accordingly the required justification of acknowledging them as true, must be explained in a non-deductive way. I further argue that analyticity in terms of deductive proof deviates significantly from Kant’s conception of analytic judgements. I conclude with two case studies. The first concerns Frege’s attempted justification of the synthetic nature of the geometrical axioms. The second deals with Hume’s Principle, which in his logicist project Frege must establish as an analytic truth.

中文翻译：

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考虑到康德，Frege的分析-合成二分法

摘要首先，我对康德的分析判断概念进行评论。然后，我转向弗雷格（Frege）的分析概念。我认为，根据逻辑公理和定义的可证明性，他对分析真理的定义是不完整的。必须以非演绎的方式解释逻辑公理和定义的必要分析性，并因此要求承认它们为真。我进一步指出，就演绎证据而言，分析性与康德的分析判断概念大相径庭。我以两个案例研究作为结束。第一个问题涉及弗雷格（Frege）尝试证明几何公理的综合性质的合理性。第二部分涉及休ume的原理，在他的逻辑主义项目中，弗雷格必须将其确立为分析真理。